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Is there an Ontological Musical Common Sense? 
Marcello Ruta  
The question of the role of our pre-theoretical or ordinary beliefs about music in musical 
ontology has already a history which, more or less officially, begins with the classical 
article of Levinson, What a musical work is, published in 1980. According to the 
interpretation formulated by Kania, in an article published in 2008, Levinson’s work has 
produced a methodological turnaround in musical ontology (and more generally in 
ontology of art
1
) by setting out new ontological priorities
2
. Musical ontology, according 
to Levinson, should take into account some entrenched beliefs which characterize our 
way in considering works of music. This methodological point is introduced in order to 
defend the creatability of musical works and consequently to reject musical Platonism
3
. 
According to Levinson, an ontology (as the Platonic one) which sacrifices the creatability 
 
1
 Already from the passage quoted in the next note, it is clear that all the considerations made by 
Levinson, even though originally formulated within the musicological context, can be easily 
applied to ontology of art in generally. This should be taken into account for the rest of the 
article, also because ontology of music is often developed within a more general frame of 
ontology of art. 
2
 «Levinson’s essay can be seen as the beginning of a concern with what exactly has priority when 
we examine the ontology of art: it is implicit in the structure of Levinson’s argument that the 
demands of the art in which one is attempting to understand trump the demands of metaphysics 
[...]. One useful way of approaching these issues is through Peter Strawson’s distinction between 
descriptive metaphysics […] and revisionary metaphysics [...]. If the ontology of art is constrained 
by ordinary artistic practice, then ontologists of art are also (or should be) engaged in a more 
descriptive than revisionary project» (Kania [2008]: 427-429, 434).  
3
 «But why should we insist that composers truly create their compositions? Why is this a 
reasonable requirement? [...] The main reason for holding to it is that it is one of the most firmly 
entrenched of our beliefs concerning art. There is probably no idea more central to thought 
about art than that it is an activity in which participants create things-these things being 
artworks» (Levinson [1980]: 8). 
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of musical works in order to gain in consistency and elegance somehow loses its grip on 
reality because we all believe that musical works are created. It can be possibly 
questioned whether Levinson was the first to consider ordinary beliefs about music (and 
about art in general) as a desideratum for any ontology of music. It is however certain 
that, after the publication of this article, this point has become unavoidable. Nowadays 
Levinson’s methodological approach has assumed a dominant position, even among 
those authors who do not share Levinson’s ontological views about musical works.  
On the other side, and this is the point which should be investigated here, Levinson’s 
desideratum has been most favorably, since its introduction, conjoined with a series of 
parallel thesis and tacit assumptions, which can be enumerated as follows:  
(1) ordinary beliefs about art have often been identified as commonsensical;  
(2) the opposition between an ontology which takes into consideration our ordinary 
beliefs about art and another one which doesn’t assign any significance to them has 
been interpreted in the light of Strawson’s classical opposition between descriptive and 
revisionary metaphysics. That is why the expression ontological descriptivism became 
commonly used;  
(3) the fact that an ontology of art cannot ignore our ordinary beliefs about art and 
artworks has been frequently identified with a so called pragmatic constraint.  
Even if these three assumptions are strictly correlated, I intend in this article to tackle 
specifically the first point, which I believe to constitute a critical point in the whole 
development of musical ontologies of the last thirty years. The second and third points 
will be also sidewise tackled. 
The identification of pre-theoretical beliefs about music (and about art more generally) 
with commonsensical beliefs has been de facto affirmed in several works of secondary 
literature; in some cases by differentiating revisionist and descriptive ontology of music
4
, 
in other cases by opposing the obviousness of our common sense beliefs about works of 
 
4
 «I briefly recall the methodological distinction done in the introduction: either is the issue of 
ontology of music addressed in a revisionist way or is this issue addressed in a descriptive way. In 
the first case, the ontological status of musical works is studied regardless of what we say and 
think usually of musical works. What drives the analysis is a general ontological question [...]. In 
the second case, it’s about understanding the mode of existence of musical works by relying on 
implicit assumptions of practice, of thought and of popular musical discourse. The goal is then to 
best account for common sense intuitions about music, or again to resolve the contradictions of 
musical discourse and practice» (Darsel [2009]: 149-150). 
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art against the difficulty in establishing an ontology of them
5
, and in some instances by 
labeling as commonsensical our ordinary belief that works of music and literature cannot 
be identified with their concrete realizations
6
, while in some examples simply by 
claiming its existence
7
. In all these quoted references (and in many other instances) the 
assumption of the commonsensical nature of our ordinary beliefs about music (or art) 
seems to me always (explicitly or implicitly) assumed. The main point of this article is to 
put into question this assumption.  
A preliminary remark to be made is that common sense, in the ontology of art (but 
possibly in the whole field of analytic philosophy) risks becoming a sort of theoretical 
ghost: everyone talks about it, but no one knows what it is. As a matter of fact, we see 
that arguments from commonsense have been used by different authors in order to 
justify different ontological paradigms. Zemach, for example, uses a commonsensical 
argument (someone not following his argument is meant to be out of his mind) in order 
to justify a nominalistic approach (even if different from Goodman’s)
8
; Kivy, in his 
 
5
 «Although the common sense understanding of works of art may be fairly obvious, determining 
the ontological status of works of art is extremely difficult, as is immediately evident from the 
extraordinary variety of answers among the major contenders. Indeed works of art (of some or 
all kinds) have been placed in just about every major ontological category—including those of 
mental entities, imaginary objects or activities, physical objects, and abstract kinds of various 
sorts» (Thomasson [2004]: 3). 
6
 «Now I argue that there is an entrenched common-sense view that different concrete artifacts 
may be realizations of one and the same artifact-type and that artifact types are not identical to 
their concrete realizations. This might not apply to all artifacts, but it is true for many - at least, to 
name a few examples, for works of music and literature, for linguistic signs and complexes of 
linguistic signs and for many (if not all) objects of everyday culture» (Reicher [2013]: 228). The 
kind of authority that, according to Reicher, such (supposed) commonsensical beliefs should 
exercise over an ontology of art (and more generally over a philosophical system) is specified a 
few lines before: «I consider a reasonable principle in philosophy, not to throw overboard 
entrenched common-sense conceptions without good reasons [...]. Deviations from common 
sense are of course possible (and often also necessary), but they fundamentally need a 
justification» (Reicher [2013]: 228).  
7
 «Whether we focus on dance, theater, film, literature, music, or the visual arts, we can 
formulate a common-sense view of what counts as a work in that art, what is involved in 
appreciation, and what constitutes artistic value, and can then find entities that pass as works in 
the late modernist tradition in that art, yet that seem to present problems for such a view» 
(Davies [2004]: 17). 
8
 «If Jones tells me that he heard Beethoven’s Missa Solemnis last night, he would probably be 
very insulted if I responded, “You mean, of course, that you heard a part of the Missa-you could 
not have heard it all”, he would rightly protest that he did hear the whole Missa indeed (i.e., he 
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important article Platonism in music: Another kind of defense, uses quite a convincing 
commonsensical argumentation
9
 in order to defend musical Platonism, while, as we 
noted previously, Levinson uses commonsensical reasons in order to attack musical 
Platonism. All these authors, even if not mentioning the notion of common sense, use its 
authority in some ways in order to defend their arguments, which (according to them) 
should be accepted by any reasonable person, by anyone who does not intend to deny 
what does not need to be demonstrated. As a matter of fact, Zemach does not 
demonstrate that by listening to a performance of a musical work, one listens to the 
whole, and not to a part of it, while Kivy does not demonstrate that, if a musical work, 
after having been listened to for decades or centuries, is discovered to have been 
composed by another author, no change to its identity would occur. Levinson, on his 
part, does not prove that musical works are indeed created. All these statements, 
emanating from those authors, do not need to be demonstrated or verified because, so 
to speak, common sense is a guarantee for them. However, we can see now how the 
issue becomes problematic, considering that these three diverse texts make different, 
even opposite statements about musical works. If any ontology borrows from common 
sense only what is convenient for its own objectives, common sense risks becoming, by 
recalling Schelling’s Absolute (in Hegel’s words), a «night where all musical ontologies 
are true».  
There are however much deeper reasons for questioning the assumption of the 
existence of musical common sense. The first point to be clarified is; what is meant by 
common sense? This notion has quite an important tradition, both in the continental 
(Vico, Reid, Oetinger) and in analytic philosophy (Peirce, Moore, Putnam). In spite (or 
possibly because) of that, there is not clear, accepted definition of common sense. 
 
did not leave in the middle). If I insisted that in order to hear the whole Missa one has to hear all 
its occurrences, including its past and future ones, he would probably believe that I had gone 
completely out of my mind» (Zemach [1970]: 243). 
9
 «There is a little prelude and chromatic fugue in E flat, long thought to be an early work of J.S. 
Bach, which we now know, through the discovery of the autograph, to be a mature work of 
Johann Christoph Bach (1642-1703). Do we want to say that we have discovered it to be a 
different work? […] Our intuition here, I think, is firm. The pull of sound structure as a concrete 
identity criterion is too powerful for us to waver from it, far too paradoxical, at least for the 
musical mind, to think of disputes over authorship, or changes in attribution as questions about 
changes in the identity of the work where, that is to say, the cases are real ones, and not 
philosophers' nightmares» (Kivy [1993]: 63).  
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Nicholas Rescher, in his Aquinas Lectures of 2005, identifies three different notions of 
common sense:  
(1) an observational common sense, which relates to the «collection and coordination 
of the deliverances of our external senses»;  
2) a judgmental common sense, which regards «matters that are obvious and evident 
to anyone of sound understanding [gesunder Menschenverstand]»; 
(3) a consensual common sense, identified (in my view mistakenly) by Rescher with the 
German notion of Gemeinsinn
10
, which is a «matter of facts that “everyone knows” and 
with respect to which there is a universal (or near-universal) agreement of people’s 
opinion». 
Even if this is not the only available categorization (the one sketched by Gadamer in 
Truth and Method, for example, is different
11
), there is an agreement about a first notion 
of common sense, rooted in the Aristotelian tradition and developed particularly in the 
Scholastics, which refers to the coordination of deliverances of external senses; this first 
notion plays no role in the considerations about common sense made in the context of 
contemporary ontology of art. On the contrary, the other two notions (in Rescher’s 
categorization) both play an important role not only in the domain of ontology of art, 
but more generally in the analytic philosophical tradition, even if it is not always clear to 
which of the two notions one is referring to. The question is, as Rescher observes, that 
these two notions are quite connected: on one side, what is considered obvious, 
normally has a universal consensus; and on the other side, what has universal 
consensus, sooner or later, will be considered, somehow, obvious. It seems here that, 
rather than two different notions of common sense, we have two different emphasis of 
one single phenomenon, which can be understood in different ways. And the difference 
between the two approaches lie in the established causal relationship: the question is to 
understand whether a particular belief enjoys consensus because it is obvious 
(judgmental common sense), or on the contrary, whether it is obvious because it enjoys 
consensus (consensual common sense). And most probably, in more than one situation, 
 
10
 In Kant’s Critique of Judgment, where can be found a quite important formulation of 
Gemeinsinn as differentiated from the Gesunder Menschenverstand, the notion of common sense 
is understood, in my view, in a different way from Rescher’s consensual common sense. See in 
this sense the passage from Carl Dahlhaus quoted at the end of the article. 
11
 See Gadamer (2004): 18-28. 
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it would be quite difficult to tell which of the two approaches is to be chosen in order to 
best interpret a commonsensical statement. 
In the case of musical common sense, however, it seems that it is possible to draw a 
line, and to state that it pertains much more to the consensual rather than judgmental 
common sense. All the cases quoted above show arguments where the consensus 
played a major role. Commonsensical statements about music are commonly accepted 
beliefs. They do not have the obvious character of statements like “pigs don’t fly”. They 
cannot have it, because they’re statements about cultural entities which, as cultural, 
cannot be obvious in the sense intended above. Still, they’re commonly accepted, and 
this common acceptance is the reason why we should have very good reasons in order 
to reject them. The same definition of ordinary beliefs about music follows in the 
direction of consensual common sense. So it seems we’re on the safe side. Musical 
common sense is a consensual common sense, according to which, works are composed 
(Levinson, Thomasson), the performance of a symphony is not a part of the symphony 
(Zemach), and a different attribution of a work of music does not change its identity 
(Kivy). This is what it seems. What it is, actually, is something different. 
The problem is that consensus and ordinary acceptance are not sufficient conditions 
for common sense beliefs: they are necessary conditions, surely, but it’s not enough to 
define a belief as commonsensical. The question posited by Rescher is the following. If 
common sense were only a question of universal consensus, we should admit that it 
evolves historically, as people in the past times thought “that the earth is flat, that the 
moon is made of green cheese, that storms at sea are manifestations of Neptune’s 
wrath”
12
 and so on. Today’s ordinary beliefs are not at all the same as centuries ago. We 
can think simply about the Copernican revolution as an example of radical changing of a 
belief shared, mainly, by the whole of humanity. So, were common sense simply a 
question of consensus, even universal consensus, we should have to admit that it would 
evolve historically. But actually, and this is Rescher’s point, common sense it is not 
simply a matter of consensus. All the commonsensical beliefs are widely accepted, but 
the opposite is not true. So we should try to «distinguish between common or popular 
beliefs in general and common-sense beliefs in specific»
13
. According to Rescher, 
common sense beliefs are characterized not only by the fact that they are popular, or 
even universal, but by the fact that they are popular because they are obvious. 
 
12
 Rescher (2005): 37. 
13
 Rescher (2005): 37. 
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Obviousness is one crucial feature of common sense
14
. Moreover, and this is a second 
crucial feature, this obviousness is not so much a pure theoretical obviousness, based on 
observation, but a pragmatic one; common sense beliefs reflect the general practical 
experience of the human being in this world
15
. That’s why, in Rescher’s view, a lot of 
popular beliefs are not strictly commonsensical. Believing in witches or dragons, and 
many of today’s current superstitions, are not beliefs grounded in the daily human 
experience of the world, and thus have nothing to do with common sense
16
. But even 
scientific theories, or simple scientific statements (the earth is round), which nowadays 
can be considered as obvious, are not for this same reason commonsensical
17
. Of course 
they can be commonsensical, but neither because they are commonly accepted nor 
because they’re obvious. This obviousness must be rooted in a common human 
experience of the world. In this sense, believing in the fact that the limit of speed is light-
speed is not commonsensical, as we don’t have any daily experience of it. In our daily 
human lives, we never try to go beyond light-speed (not to mention to achieve it). 
 
14
 «Universality is not the crux of common sense as such. Rather, the pervasiveness at issue is a 
consequence of the obviousness that the definition of commonsensicalness requires. In sum, 
universality of acceptance is at once a consequence of and an indicator of the presence of that 
obviousness that demonstrates common-sense beliefs» (Rescher [2005]: 33). In this sense, 
Rescher explicitly adopts the judgmental version of common sense: «It is this sort of judgmental 
common sense, as explained above, that will lie at the center of the present deliberations» 
(Rescher [2005]: 19). 
15
 «There is thus a big difference between merely common beliefs that are very widespread and 
perhaps even general and specifically commonsensical beliefs. This difference lies in the fact that 
commonsensical beliefs are determined as such not simply by the fact that they are widespread 
but rather by the explanatory rationale of why this is so, namely, because such beliefs are what 
they are on account of their role in a cognitive agent’s modus operandi in satisfying human needs 
[…]. It is this essentially pragmatic grounding what through facilitating the satisfaction of human 
needs serves to define commonsensical beliefs as such» (Rescher [2005]: 38-39). 
16
 «It is certainly not the case that every widely or even generally held belief is a matter of 
common sense. Many people believe in astrology and many, perhaps even most, people believe 
in certain superstitions [...]. Such things are the very opposite of common sense because what is 
required for common sense is grounding in a general principle that reflects the general 
experience of mankind in meeting human needs [...]. And it is thus its grounding in the general 
run of everyday experience rather than a generality of endorsement that makes a generalization 
“only a matter of common sense”» (Rescher [2005]: 37-38). 
17
 «The structure of the earth-as-a-whole, the material composition the moon, and the causative 
basis of sea-storms all represent issues that transcend the resources of common sense as we 
here understand it. None of these are matters which figure patently in the common experiences 
of great masses of people» (Rescher [2005]: 37). 
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Believing in the force of gravity it is much more commonsensical, as we have daily 
experiences with this law. If you take a stone in your hand and you let it go, it will fall. 
This belief can be called commonsensical, because it’s always been part of the basic 
human experiences.  
So common sense beliefs are commonly accepted because they derive from a common 
experience. According to Rescher, however, the common sense is not just a collection of 
practical advice, i.e. it is not only a question of pragmatics, but also and in the first 
instance of epistemology, as he states
18
. In other words, common sense beliefs 
constitute a sort of common image of the world, but this common image is based on 
human practical experience. Of course commonsensical beliefs can also include 
pragmatic rules, and can be related to the prudence, the phronesis. The crucial point, 
however, is that, according to Rescher’s formulation of common sense (which I support), 
even the less practical common sense beliefs, including Moore’s «whole long list of 
propositions, which may seem, at first sight, such obvious truisms as not to be worth 
stating», because they are «a set of propositions, every one of which (in my own 
opinion) I know, with certainty, to be true»
19
, even such truisms must be rooted in our 
daily commerce with the world to be considered commonsensical. Everyone knows that 
stones fall on the floor if dropped, that stones don’t fly, not because everyone has read 
Galileo’s essays, but because everyone has had at least an experience of it in his life. 
And, to be honest, common sense would affirm that «the heavier the stone, the quicker 
the rate of falling», which is what Aristotle stated, and which is actually wrong, as 
Galileo subsequently discovered. But this is the experience we have (we never make 
experiences in absence of attritions, so the weight actually influences the falling speed), 
and common sense, in first instance, would affirm that. The commonsensical image of 
the world is shaped by our ordinary, daily basic experiences in the world. 
This last point is critical, from different points of views. In the first instance, it seems to 
justify the identification between pre-theoretical (commonsensical) beliefs about music 
 
18
 «But in the end, then, common-sense facts are not really a matter of biology (of hard-wired 
connections imprinted by biological evolution) or a matter of sociology (of the statistically shared 
connections of the social group). Rather, they are a matter of epistemology; of considerations so 
fundamental and evident that their acceptability-warrant is very bit as strong as anything that 
could possibly be adduced on their behalf» (Rescher [2005]: 39). 
19
 Moore (1959): 32. The question whether also in Moore’s case the commonsensical character of 
such truisms is grounded in a common human experience of the world cannot be answered in 
this place.  
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and a so called pragmatic constraint of musical ontology. Were our pre-theoretical 
beliefs about music commonsensical, then they should be rooted in our practical 
experience with music, and so finally with our musical practices. What is to be 
questioned, however, is whether the identification between pre-theoretical beliefs 
about music and a (supposed) musical common sense is legitimate. I don’t think so.  
As a matter of fact, Rescher’s pragmatic formulation of common sense not only 
excludes from the commonsense beliefs about extra-ordinary things, which might at a 
particular moment gain even an universal and popular consensus, thereby becoming 
ordinary beliefs (for example the fact that light-speed is the speed-limit); the fact of 
being rooted in basic practical human experiences excludes from common sense also 
other beliefs which are culturally conditioned and therefore historically changing. 
Actually, were common sense assumptions culturally and historically conditioned, to 
claim its authority would, in the first and last instance, be a form of cultural or historical 
hegemony. So, by accepting Rescher’s formulation of common sense, as a common 
image of the world, common not only because it is obvious and widely accepted, but 
because the underlying consensus and obviousness is grounded on a common human 
experience of the world, we accept also a sort of trans-historical and trans-cultural 
dimension of common sense which, on the other side, represents the authoritative 
moment of it. This latter point is, in my view, even more relevant in the case of an 
assumed authority of commonsensical beliefs about ontology, musical or not. 
Ontological definitions and statements should not be historically or culturally 
determined. Even when we affirm, for example, that artworks are historical objects (as 
Rohrbaugh does), or that they are cultural emergent entities (as Margolis does), these 
definitions should not be themselves historical or culturally determined. Ontology has the 
ambition of making assertions about what there is: it can state the historicity and the 
cultural dependency of what there is, but its own statements cannot be historically or 
culturally dependent. Of course, we could include ontological statements in the realm of 
what there is, so assuming a meta-ontological point of view we could claim that 
ontological statements are historically and culturally determined. But the regressum ad 
infinitum would be more than evident, meta-ontological statements could be also put 
into the realm of what there is, and be therefore considered as historically dependent. 
Finally, returning to our subject, a musical ontologist who states «Well, today musical 
works are platonic universals, tomorrow I don’t really know, because ordinary beliefs 
about music could change in the next 24 hours», would not be taken seriously. But 
changing the number of 24 hours in 24 centuries, in this context, makes no substantial 
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difference. So if we give authority to our ordinary beliefs about music, it’s because we 
implicitly admit that they’re commonsensical, in the sense of Rescher, that they are not 
culturally or historically determined. And we have to add: Were ordinary beliefs (about 
music, or art) commonsensical in this way, the appellative of descriptive ontology would 
be fully justified, as Strawson’s distinction is grounded on the admission of «a massive 
central core of human thinking which has no history», constituting the basis of 
descriptive metaphysics, opposed to revisionary metaphysics which, on the contrary, is 
historically changing
20
. 
The point to be made now is that, in my view, «a massive central core of human 
thinking related to musical ontology, which has no history», does not exist. The pre-
theoretical thoughts about music therefore cannot neither be identified with musical 
descriptivism, nor (and maybe more important) with a supposed existing musical 
common sense. The problem of musical common sense is that it does not exist, and even 
if it existed, it would have nothing to do with questions related to musical ontology. This 
hypothesis could explain in the first instance why different philosophers used (more or 
less implicitly) common sense authority in order to justify opposite ontological 
paradigms. Already this detail should make us suspect that this musical common sense is 
perhaps not so safe and sure. Still I would like to voice my denial of the existence of 
musical common sense by three arguments which, I hope, will be convincing. 
The first argument is related to the notion of creation which, according to Levinson 
(and many others after him) should be an undeniable aspect of our pre-theoretical 
beliefs about music. According to Levinson, none on this earth would ever cast into 
doubt that musical works have been created, more specifically created by the 
composers, and in this act of creation resides the same value of the composer and the 
respect that we normally attribute to him. For this same reason, Amie Thomasson can 
affirm that «Any view that identifies works of art (of any kind) with pure abstract 
structures immediately encounters other conflicts with the common sense conception 
of art»
21
. This statement is actually false, as long as we assume (contrary to what 
 
20
 Strawson (1990): 10. See also Note 35. 
21
 The whole passage shows how commonsensical beliefs and musical practices are often, if not 
identified, at least cast as an inseparable couple: «Any view that identifies works of art (of any 
kind) with pure abstract structures immediately encounters other conflicts with the common 
sense conception of art. For types and kinds, traditionally understood, exist eternally, 
independently from all human activities; thus, contra traditional beliefs and practices regarding 
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Thomasson does, as will be shown later) a notion of common sense in line with the one 
formulated by Rescher. It is correct to state that nowadays the idea of creation is central 
to the same notion of art. The same words creative and creativity are used in many 
contexts, maybe too many and too often, and these uses are all related, more or less 
explicitly, to the idea of the artistic endeavor, as creatio ex nihilo, in bringing into 
existence something that was not there before. All this is true. What is, on the contrary, 
quite doubtful, is to state that the notion of work of art as a product of human creation 
is commonsensical, i.e. that it has always been a central thought in the human history 
and across different cultures. This is not the case. I can put forward my argument 
against the commonsensical character of the concept of artistic creation in four 
sequential stages: (1) From a theoretical point of view, the concept of creation was 
totally absent from the philosophical panorama of ancient philosophy, including Plato 
and Aristotle, who in turn should not be considered as an insignificant part of the 
western philosophical tradition. As Höffe pointed out
22
, among others, ancient thought 
did not contemplate the concept of creatio ex nihilo. On the contrary, the 
Weltanschauung of ancient Greece was philosophically dominated by two concepts of 
eternity, a Platonist one (the ideas are eternal as extra-temporal, unchangeable entities 
not submitted to the time, i.e. to the kingdom of changing things), and the Aristotelian 
one (the unmoved-mover is eternal as sempiternal, as source of the infinite time and 
infinite change
23
). In any case, the idea of creation is not at all obvious in ancient Greek 
thought. (2) As Jimenez pointed out, if on one side Christian theology has significantly 
contributed to the introduction of the concept of creation in western thought, this 
concept was for centuries the privilege of God. The human being was not at all meant to 
create things, as he was himself a creature, a created being. The idea of human creation 
began to be envisaged more clearly after the Renaissance, though mainly emanating 
from the artistic domain, where, together with the disappearing of the craft guilds, the 
transition from the artisan to the artist is in evidence; as a consequence, artworks 
become more and more directly connected to their authors (it is in in this period that 
artists began signing their works). In the philosophical domain however, it was 
Romanticism, through the notion of the Genius, which decisively affirmed the creative 
 
the arts, works of art on such models cannot genuinely be created by artists at all, but only 
selected from the range of available types or kinds» (Thomasson [2004]: 10). 
22
 See Höffe (2009): 90-91. 
23
 See Michon (2004): 305-333. 
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power of the artist
24
. And actually it is probably this very romantic figure, which is, so to 
say, the ancestor of the currently and commonly accepted idea that works of art are 
creations of the author. The same status of art is in my view nowadays still heavily 
conditioned by this romantic heritage
25
. However, we’re talking, in fact, of a concept 
which imposed itself most certainly only in the last two centuries. Before that time 
(evidently, as always in this case, such statements should not be taken too strictly, 
exceptions can be found in the different domains) the idea of the artist as a creator of 
works of art was not at all a central piece in the conceptual repertory of western culture. 
(3) In the Romantic Aesthetics, however, we can find also a strongly significant platonic 
element, according to which the artist is not actually creating, but only recognizing and 
reproducing platonic ideas. Both Schelling’s and Schopenhauer’s formulations of the 
activity of the Genius contain strong elements of Platonism, which are evidently in 
conflict with the concept of human creation. The artistic Genius, in Schelling’s case, is a 
sort of “God’s messenger”, and only God, strictly speaking, should be considered the 
immediate cause of all art («Die unmittelbare Ursache aller Kunst»
26
); In the case of 
Schopenhauer, the Genius is a sort of decoder of eternal ideas, which are somehow 
hidden behind the changing multiplicity of the world as representation, and constitute 
the eternal metaphysical forms of the reality
27
. (4) This platonic element is still present 
also in the contemporary pre-theoretical thoughts about music and art in general, when 
we consider the concept of inspiration, which is possibly the most widely used word in 
our daily conversations about art. The difference between the artisan and the artist is 
that the artist should not only master the technique of production (composing or 
performing), but should also be inspired. Only through inspiration it is claimed somehow 
that the creativity of the work is ensured. But what is inspiration if not the idea of the 
human mind coming into contact with something coming from outside, received, much 
more than created, by the mind (or the spirit or the soul) of the composer? The common 
concept of inspiration is therefore also linked with the popular version of the romantic 
figure of the Genius, as the man who is capable to get in touch with God, to receive the 
ideas from God and pass them on to human kind. 
 
24
 See Jimenez (1997): 34-36, 41-44. 
25
 This point cannot be further developed here, as it would deserve. 
26 
See Schelling (1856-1861): V, 386-387, 458-460. 
27
 See Schopenhauer (1819): § 36. 
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Finally, already by limiting ourselves to the western civilization, which is in any case 
quite a remarkable restriction, the idea of artistic creation is a quite young one. It is less 
than a thousand years old and surely its acceptance into the repertory of popular beliefs 
about art is most probably even much younger. Moreover, the notion of inspiration, 
which is as much entrenched as that of creation, seems to suggest that the artist, rather 
than creating a work of art, is almost receiving his ideas from external sources, from God 
as it is believed to be in the most of cases. To state that the concept of creation is 
commonsensical therefore means not only to make out of a quite restricted (temporally 
and spatially) cultural paradigm the model of human common sense, but also to select 
from our popular beliefs about art and music only a part of them, while almost ignoring 
the other part. On the contrary, the very brief considerations made here should suggest 
that, even within western civilization, the ideas about the coming to existence of a work 
of art have changed dramatically, and in some cases they are not at all consistent (the 
concept of creation seems inconsistent with the one of inspiration). There are in my 
view enough supporting elements to assume that, should we look outside the western 
civilization, we could potentially find other different ideas about this subject. I feel 
therefore entitled to state the following: there is no commonsensical view about 
creatability of musical works. There are different historical moments and cultural 
traditions, in which some ideas about it have been predominant, and in some cases they 
have coexisted with opposite ideas. 
The second argument I’m going to develop in order to refute the thesis of the 
existence of a musical common sense, and which therefore applies to the same notion 
of musical descriptivism, is related to the concept itself of musical work. Actually, any 
statement relating to the existence of a commonsensical view about what musical works 
are presupposes de facto that there is a commonsensical view about the concept of 
musical work. Even if the commonsensical view about musical works were that musical 
works do not exist, this negative statement would require the assumption of a common 
(sensical) understanding of the concept of musical work. This assumption, as it is well 
known, has been confuted by Lydia Goehr, who, in the chapter Musical production 
without the Work-Concept of her important work related to this subject, shows how the 
idea of the work of music as an achieved artifact, as a product of the activity of the 
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composer, a product, furthermore, whose existence and essence is independent from its 
performances, was not at all recognized before the 19
th
 century
28
. 
However, the issue is even worse than that. The question is not only related to the 
music before the 19
th
 century, but also to the music after the 19
th
 century, and not 
pertaining to the Western cultivated music. As a matter of fact, the very concept of 
musical work is not at all a univocal one. Zofia Lissa shows, for example, how the 
apparently commonsensical idea that a musical work should have a beginning and an 
end is not at all an obvious one, if we widen our perspective to the extra-European 
music, or even aleatory contemporary music
29
. On the other side, popular music is often 
not written in musical text, and so we must allow for radical variations in different 
performances, which make it difficult to define the uniqueness of a specific musical work 
(besides often lacking authorial attribution) performed at different times
30
. At one 
moment, Zofia Lissa puts forward the radical (and rhetorical) question of whether the 
category of Work of Music (not to mention its ontological characteristics, such as 
creatability or repeatability) is valid for all music cultures and periods
31
. The answered 
response is the following: 
The category of musical work is a historical category [...]. This means that in certain periods 
of the development of musical culture the activity of man’s sonic statements expresses itself 
in works, in others in sound structures with other ontological units; these entities pertain 
with no doubt to music, but not to the class of musical works. The music was different in 
different times and civilizations of the globe, and the thinking in terms of only a civilization 
and a historical time requires a fundamental revision.
 32
 
If Lissa (and Goehr too) is correct, it becomes difficult to talk about ontological musical 
common sense. If on one side common sense should constitute a series of human 
beliefs which are, substantially, independent from time and space, from geography and 
history, pertaining so to say to the human civilization as such, and if on the other side 
 
28
 «The idea of a work of music existing as a fixed creation independently of its many possible 
performances had no regulative force in a practice that demanded adaptable and functional 
music, and which allowed an open interchange of musical material. […] Music was not always 
produced to outlast its performance or survive more than a few performances. And when it did 
survive many performances, numerous changes could and usually would be made to the music in 
the process» (Goehr [1992]: 185-186). 
29
 See Lissa (1975): 175. 
30
 See Lissa (1975): 12-13. 
31
 See Lissa (1975): 11. 
32
 Lissa (1975): 52-53. 
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the very basic concept of any musical ontology, namely the concept of musical work, 
varies from culture to culture, to tradition to tradition, and in some cases, according to 
Lissa’s and Goehr’s view, we can even talk of musical practices without musical works, 
we can then see that the existence of musical common sense, at least in relation to 
musical ontology, is actually only an illusion. More than that, it is not only an illusion, but 
a culturally biased illusion, making out of our cultural paradigm a rule valid for the whole 
human history, which is not only inexact, but also unfair. In the claim about the 
existence of commonsensical beliefs about what musical works are I see also what Lissa 
notices in a lot of philosophers (including her teacher Ingarden) of music, which mainly 
extrapolate from their culturally and socially limited perspective a sort of human rule, 
valid for all cultures and all times:  
The views about the essence of music are by all aestheticians historically limited, as they 
refer to a musical practice, i.e. to such a type of works, their performances and to such a 
kind of their reception, which is provided to philosophers by their age, their environment 
and the culture to which they belong. The fundamental error committed by different 
philosophers who formulate aesthetic theories, is in fact that they consider themselves as 
absolute representative of the entire species “man”, and make their own way (among others 
psychologically, historically, socially determined ) of assimilating art universally and 
objectively valid, from Pithecanthropus to Atomic Era.
33
 
We can apply this passage to our case: The fundamental mistake of philosophers 
claiming the existence of an ontological musical common sense is the one of making out 
of the popular musical beliefs about musical works, valid in a particular historical, 
cultural and social milieu, a sort of anthropological paradigm and consequently an 
ontological constraint. Without the implicit assumption that our categories for thinking 
about music are valid for all the rest of humanity, the same word of commonsensical 
would lose its meaning and the authority given to these same beliefs would lose its 
ground. 
As a matter of fact, the idea of a plurality of musical traditions, and so of different 
ordinary musical beliefs, is confirmed by a series of texts. I will take here the examples 
of two among the most significant ones, Andrew Kania and Amie Thomasson, and this 
will be my third and last argument against the same concept of ontological musical 
common sense (and consequently of ontological musical descriptivism). 
 
33
 Lissa (1975): 173. 
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In his text about the methodology of musical ontology, Kania, as we saw in the second 
note, explicitly states the need, for an ontology, which aims to take into account musical 
practices, to be a descriptivist one. A few pages later, however, Kania affirms that 
descriptive musical ontologies are somehow condemned to pluralism, because different 
situations or different circumstances generate different beliefs about music: 
Although Strawson mentions that it is unlikely any metaphysician has been wholly 
descriptive or revisionary, it seems to me that we should think of theorists not as partly the 
one and partly the other, but as falling on a spectrum between two polar extremes. At the 
descriptive end of the spectrum is the particularist, who argues that there is no such thing as 
the ontological nature of the artwork, the musical work, the classical musical work for 
performance, or any kind of artwork. We must look at the particular details in any given 
case, describing each work as it is, rather than fitting them all, or any group of them, into a 
Procrustean ontological theory. For the extreme descriptivist, to describe the work as it is, is 
simply to report how people think of it.
34
 
We can only mention here how far we are from Strawson’s idea of descriptive 
metaphysics, which is exactly defined as a substantially stable, meta-historical (and 
meta-cultural) metaphysics, we could say an anthropologically grounded metaphysics of 
the «commonplaces of the least refined thinking», opposed to revisionary metaphysics, 
which, like Kuhn’s Paradigms, change along the path of human history
35
. 
Amie Thomasson, in her article about the ontology of art, published in the Blackwell 
Companion of Aesthetics, expresses the radical thesis that ordinary beliefs about 
artworks, even when they’re not explicitly formulating a musical ontology, «determine 
 
34
 Kania (2008): 435. 
35
 The key passage, that I quote in order to avoid misunderstandings about Strawson’s idea of 
descriptive metaphysics, is the following: «It might be held that metaphysics was essentially an 
instrument of conceptual change, a means of furthering or registering new directions or styles of 
thought. Certainly concepts do change, and not only, though mainly, on the specialist periphery; 
and even specialist changes react on ordinary thinking. Certainly, too, metaphysics has been 
largely concerned with such changes, in both the suggested ways. But it would be a great blunder 
to think of metaphysics only in this historical style. For there is a massive central core of human 
thinking which has no history – or none recorded in histories of thought; there are categories and 
concepts which, in their most fundamental character, change not at all. Obviously there are not 
the specialties of the most refined thinking. They are the commonplaces of the least refined 
thinking; and are yet the indispensable core of the conceptual equipment of the most 
sophisticated human beings. It is with these interconnections, and the structure that they form, 
that a descriptive metaphysics will be primarily concerned» (Strawson [1990]: 10). 
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the ontological status of the works and kinds of works referred to»
36
, and consequently, 
the only valuable criterion of success for musical ontologies is consistency with the 
ontology presupposed by or formulated in such beliefs
37
. In Thomasson’s argument we 
should accept such beliefs not because they are commonsensical, but because we don’t 
have any better criteria (e.g. causal theories of reference
38
). What remains, is that, on 
one side, Thomasson identifies such beliefs with a pre-supposed musical common sense 
(in note 36 she defines ordinary beliefs as common sense view). On the other side, she 
explicitly makes clear that such beliefs are strongly related to the different musical 
practices, and that often such practices somehow presuppose some ontological 
statements, which are therefore tacitly assumed. In another article, Thomasson states 
that different art traditions and practices use different terms for designating different 
entities in relation to the works of art: 
An interesting consequence of the idea that “art” is not a category-specifying term is 
that there may in principle be more ontological kinds of art than are recognized by us as 
our familiar art kinds and named by our familiar art-kind terms, and the ontological 
kinds of works of art may vary from place to place. For if different cultures have 
different category-specifying art-kind terms, and different individuative and evaluative 
practices that go along with these, these may name different kinds of work of art. 
Similarly, the ontological kinds of art there are may vary over time, and ontologically 
 
36
 «Of course this does not mean that artists, critics, or others responsible for establishing the 
reference of names of works of art and of general terms such as “painting”, “symphony” or 
“novel” must have a fully developed theory of the ontological status of works of art in formal 
philosophical terms. Instead, it is enough that they have basic views about the relation between 
works of art and the relevant physical objects, copies and performances such as those described 
in the common sense view [...]. It seems entirely plausible, even requisite, that artists and others 
in the art world have (at some level) these kinds of beliefs; such beliefs also form the backbone of 
practices of selling, displaying, performing, and restoring works of art of various kinds» 
(Thomasson [2004]: 17). 
37
 «Coherence with just these background practices and (tacit or explicit) beliefs is typically used 
in assessing various positions about the ontology of works of art [...]. If the above discussion is 
correct, this is entirely appropriate, for—provided one accepts that at least some names of works 
of art and terms for kinds of works of art refer—it is such beliefs and practices that determine the 
ontological status of the works and kinds of works referred to» (Thomasson [2004]: 17). 
38
 «One cannot appeal to causal theories of reference to motivate the view that the common 
sense conceptions of artists, composers, critics, and audience regarding the ontological kinds of 
symphonies, paintings, or novels may all be radically mistaken, and that a theory in radical 
violation of those assumptions may be true» (Thomasson [2004]: 16). 
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new forms of art may be introduced, e.g., various forms of internet art may differ in 
ontological status from works of such familiar kinds as paintings and movies.
39
 
Both Thomasson’s and Kania’s considerations arrive in sum to the same conclusion: 
ordinary beliefs about music are conditioned by space and time, by geography and 
history, because they change according to the different musical (or artistic) traditions. 
Both of them do not make the mistake of unilateralism: they don’t extrapolate from a 
particular musical tradition and culture the paradigm of the whole of humanity. On the 
contrary, we can see particularly in the quoted passage of Thomasson, how the 
pluralism of traditions, and consequently of individuative and evaluative practices about 
works of art, is explicitly stated and assumed. The criticism of Zofia Lissa therefore does 
not apply to these two cases. What remains, however, is that, on the one hand, the 
supposed commonsensical character of such ordinary beliefs (and consequently Kania’s 
definition of ontologies taking into account such beliefs as descriptivist ontologies) 
becomes more than doubtful. On the other hand, Thomasson’s position de facto 
reduces the ontology of art to an epistemology of art, and we have to add, to a culturally 
dependent epistemology. The result of such an approach is that, an object (an artwork) 
can pertain to two different and incompatible ontological categories at the same time, 
as different cultural traditions can have different beliefs and individuative practices 
about it. Finally, in my view, the authority given to ordinary beliefs loses a lot of force 
from the moment that we admit the cultural and historical dependence of such beliefs.  
The three arguments developed here seem to me, finally, to show how the assumption 
of an ontological musical common sense is more than doubtful: as a matter of fact, this 
is my thesis, there is no ontological musical common sense, because there is not a single 
music tradition, but a plurality of musical cultures, traditions and practices, within which 
different beliefs about music accordingly develop. The same concept of musical 
descriptivism seems therefore inapplicable, for Strawson’s concept of descriptivism, as 
we have seen, entails the assumption of commonsensical beliefs which do not change 
across history and cultures.  
We should add a last consideration. The concept of ontological musical common sense 
is, in our view, even more problematic than the achievement of a unique concept of 
music which, as Dahlhaus has already stressed in an important passage, should be 
possibly thought, in a Kantian way, as a regulative principle: 
 
39
 Thomasson (2006): 251. 
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The driving motive, that stood behind the idea “one” music [...] was the classic humanitarian 
utopia that in Kant's Critique of Judgment founded a Aesthetics, in which the judgment of 
taste is “subjective” and yet “universal”, and indeed insofar as the Subjective tend to a 
“sensus communis”, to a “common sense”. But if humanity finds its expression in the 
principle of respect of an irremovable otherness, instead of in the discovery of a common 
substance, one remains faithful to the idea of “one” music true precisely by abandoning the 
concept of substance in order to restitute her as a regulative principle of mutual 
understanding.
40
  
If the concept of “one” musical «sensus communis» is already problematic, the idea of 
an «ontological musical common sense» should be considered untenable. As Lissa and 
Goehr demonstrated, the same concept of musical work, which is de facto the backbone 
of any musical ontology (even a nihilist one) is far from being commonly understood in 
the different musical traditions. Some traditions do not simply need such a concept, 
because in their musical practices the achievement of musical activity is not a univocally 
identifiable entity, Platonic or Aristotelian it could be. So even a regulative role of the 
concept of musical work (and consequently the regulative role of the idea of an 
«ontological musical common sense ») seems to me, from the beginning, excluded. 
Possibly one day we will be able to define both a minimal basic concept of music and of 
musical common sense. But surely, these minimal concepts won’t include neither the 
notion of musical work, nor the notion of creatability or many other notions pertaining 
to the musical ontology (such as musical structure, means of production, aesthetical 
properties). In the effort of common understanding among different musical practices 
and traditions, an understanding which should drive us towards a common concept of 
music, we should start from the acceptance of the fact that these same musical 
traditions and practices don’t share a common ontology. 
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